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Abstract 
 
This study explores the link between financialization and employee wages. Using a panel of 
European banks from Bankscope we test whether banks use leverage strategically in order to 
refrain wage increases, focusing on the strategic use of banks’ capital structure as a disciplinary 
mechanism. The results indicate the existence of a negative and significant effect of leverage on 
average employee wages. In addition, considering that the effects of leverage could depend on 
individual bank risk, we extend our analysis to distressed banks, using the z-score as a measure 
to distinguish banks that are more prone to bankruptcy. We also observe that leverage is 
statistically significant when relating to average wages; however the impact does not differ in 
magnitude in comparison to non-distressed banks. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial markets have witnessed significant transformations and at the same time, they have 
become an important subsector of the economy. Thus, a well-functioning financial system will be 
determinant for economic development. In this context, the role of banks within the financial system 
is crucial, as their functioning affects the economy in several ways. This paper considers that 
financialization has changed the landscape of corporate governance in the banking sector. 
Several studies have been focused on analysing the increasing role of financial markets and 
a considerable progress has been made in assessing the macroeconomic changes associated to 
financialization. However, relatively little work has been developed at the microeconomic level, 
therefore our main contribution is to analyse the significance of some dynamics that emerged from 
financialization and which are recognized by the literature, as the maximization of shareholder 
value and the reduction in the bargaining power of labour and to link these trends with changes in 
labour pay at the firm level. 
The paper contributes to the literature on wages in the banking sector, establishing a relation 
between the banks’ capital structure and average wages. The goal of this research is comparable 
to that of Bertay and Uras (2016) in that both studies consider the link between finance and the 
labour market, with a special focus on the relation between leverage and employee pay. However, 
our study focuses on the strategic use of the capital structure of banks, whereas Bertay and Uras 
(2016) put more weight on the monitoring and institutional quality of countries. 
Therefore, the objective of the study is to examine how average wages are affected by leverage, 
focusing on the strategic use of banks’ capital structure. The underlying assumption is that banks 
may use leverage strategically in order to renegotiate labour contracts and to impose the reduction 
of wages. In addition, in this paper, we consider their organizational structure considering the 
differentiation between stakeholder-oriented banks and shareholder-oriented banks.  
The present study examines a panel of European banks for the 1987-2015 period. The 
banking sector has suffered several transformations in corporate governance and in the banking 
management models, simultaneously, the importance of this subsector in the economy is clear at 
the point that banking instability is rapidly reflected in the real economy. 
We depart from a baseline OLS regression, however in order to consider the occurrence of 
potential endogeneity, first, we re-estimate our model using the first lags of the explanatory 
variables; second, we employ a conventional instrumental variable analysis and a novel 
identification strategy exploiting heteroscedasticity proposed by Lewbel (2012). In addition, to take 
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advantage of the panel structure of our data, we also apply a fixed effects panel data model. We 
find that banks may use their capital structure strategically since leverage has a negative effect on 
average wages. 
Since the effect of leverage may depend on individual bank risk, we use z-score. This widely 
used measure of bank risk presents an estimate of a bank’s probability of insolvency. In this sense, 
we examine the effect of leverage for distressed banks and find that notwithstanding, that leverage 
is negatively and statistically significant, when relating to average wages. The results do not present 
evidence that the effect of leverage on average wages differ according to the type of bank. 
We also highlight the potential non-linear relationship between leverage and average wages. 
In this sense, we assess if the effect of leverage may differ according to different levels of leverage. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature 
that motivates our study. The following section focuses on the data and the description of the 
sample and it also presents the descriptive statistics for some of the variables used. Section 4 
presents the empirical model estimation strategy. The empirical results are reported in Sections 5 
and 6. Finally, Section 7 presents the main conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Financialization, corporate governance and labour share 
The increasing role of finance has established a common perception of the “increasing role of 
financial activities, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of 
the domestic and international economies” (Epstein, 2005: 3). Its impacts on the economic system 
can be summarized in the growing importance of financial activity over real activity, which originates 
a transfer from the real to the financial sector and an increase of income inequality and wage 
stagnation (Palley, 2007). As Giovannoni (2014) points out, the term financialization is an 
expression of the importance of the financial sector and it can be stated not only by the increasing 
role of financial markets and institutions, but also by “shareholder value orientation, increasing 
household debt, changes in attitudes of individuals, increasing incomes from financial activities, 
increasing frequency of financial crises, and increasing capital mobility” (Stockhammer, 2010: 2). 
Financialization has been referred as one of the drivers for the decline in labour share, however 
the way it affects the wage share can be presented in several but not independent ways. As stated 
by Giovannoni (2014), globalization and deregulation in financial markets has allowed firms to 
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become less dependent of national opportunities of investment and domestic hiring. Thus, they 
have improved their bargaining position at the expense of employees. Another way in which 
financialization may affect wage share is by increasing the decline in wage share, which is already 
observed and explained by structural changes such as the increase in trade, globalization, 
technological change or the increase in the CEOs’ pay, among others. Moreover, the rise of the 
shareholder-oriented corporate governance has put limitations in the occurrence of agency 
problems between managers and shareholders. Finally, other factors that influence price mark-up 
have contributed towards the increase in profit share in detriment of wage share. Those factors are 
related with the increase in mark-up in the financial sector, contributing towards the reduction of 
labour share and the reduction of the workers’ bargaining positions. 
Bearing in mind the limited empirical work on the influence of financialization on income 
distribution, Dünhaupt (2012) considers in her work the linkage between financialization and the 
distribution of income and tries to assess its relation with the decrease in labour share. Therefore, 
as is pointed out by the author, liberalization and deregulation have contributed to the increasing 
importance of shareholder value, as remuneration is more aligned to performance, additionally, 
managerial pay has also increased. So, we may expect that financialization contributes to the 
decrease in labour share. As remuneration is more aligned to the concept of shareholder value, 
ordinary employees need to deal with an efficiency improvement strategy of the firm, that can lead 
to restructuring and which can be negative for workers since they may incur in a reduction of their 
share of income, as real wages decline. 
A shareholder value maximization strategy is also presented by Darcillon (2012) as an 
explanation for the erosion on the workers’ bargaining power. Notwithstanding, the workers that 
remain at the firm, may benefit from pay increases, the same is not true for those directly affected 
by measures to reduce workforce or to increase labour market flexibility. This value creating 
strategy is also considered by Azmat et al. (2012) as maximizing shareholder value and it may 
mitigate some agency problems that motivate managers to obtain private benefits as job protection 
or “empire building”.  
According to Palley (2007), financialization has brought changes1 that cannot be disentangled 
from the evolution that occurred in the financial sector, so among others, financialization has 
changed corporate behaviour and has contributed to a new business model based on shareholder 
                                                 
1 Besides corporate behaviour, Palley (2007) also refers to the structure and operation of financial markets and to economic policy as important 
changes that have been brought by interests of the financial sector. 
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value (Clarke, 2014). The shareholder value orientation and the alignment of management 
compensation with shareholder interests, has put into question the pressure of financial markets 
on dividend payments or stock purchases and its relation to mark-up. The existence of a market 
for corporate control has put into question the disciplinary device of M&A and by doing so, financial 
markets have worked towards aligning managers/shareholder interests. This focus on the 
relationship between firms and financial markets, as the author points out, has been used to 
rationalize top management pay increase and to justify the rise in takeover operations. Palley 
(2007: 15) also refers to the adoption of “a cult of debt finance” since there are tax benefits relating 
to increased debt; other explanations for this trend are related with the reduction of the workers’ 
bargaining power as managers may use debt strategically to reduce a firm’s free cash flow and by 
doing so wage reduction may occur. 
Dünhaupt (2011, 2014) focuses on the concept of shareholder value orientation and its 
relation to financialization for the explanation of income inequality. As pointed out by the author, 
an increasing movement of compensation of corporate officers may be observed, while ordinary 
workers have seen their wages stagnate or even decline. The maximization of shareholder value 
constitutes an explanation for wage dispersion and for the rise in executive compensation as an 
alignment of manager/shareholder interests is observed, which, in practice, reflects that 
compensation packages are aligned to stock price movements and to performance indicators 
(Dünhaupt, 2014). However, as the author points out, the financialization and the increasing focus 
on shareholder value orientation has contributed to wage dispersion as it is observed that, in spite 
the rise in the managers’ income, ordinary workers suffer from a decrease or even a stagnation of 
their wages, making them more vulnerable. This is also pointed out by Stockhammer (2005) who 
refers that the increase in efficiency under the pursuing of the creation of shareholder value is 
positive; however, this will put into conflict employment and growth as shareholders will earn at 
the expense of workers. 
It may also be observed, that the adoption of a shareholder value maximization strategy may 
put the focus on high stock prices, which can be obtained by downsizing and restructuring, which 
results in the dismissal of employees. Therefore, downsizing constitutes a negative consequence 
of shareholder value orientation (Dunhaupt, 2012; Stockhammer, 2005). Moreover, high stock 
prices can also be obtained through the substitution of equity by debt, which increases the return 
on equity thus benefiting higher income segments. As a result of the rise in financial payments, 
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there is a redistribution of income with a detrimental effect in the wage share (Dünhaupt, 2012, 
2013; Hanka, 1998; and Hein and Shoder, 2011). 
As Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000: 18) argue, a shift from a “retain and reinvest” to a 
“downsize and distribute” strategic orientation was observed, and this will imply a size reduction 
in terms of employment, in order to increase the return on equity. This idea is also present in 
Fligstein and Shin (2007) who argue that the maximization of shareholder value focuses on the 
increase of returns on assets, since for managers what matters is to ensure higher profits for 
shareholders, without bearing in mind the worker’s interests. The pressure of the financial 
community towards shareholder value maximization strategies has resulted in the reorganization 
of firms with strategic decisions on facilities, employment and technology. 
Financialization has contributed towards the reduction in the bargaining power of labour2, as 
firms may use strategically their capital structure. According to Perotti and Spier (1993), firms 
could use leverage strategically in order to renegotiate labour contracts and to impose the reduction 
of wages. By retiring equity through a junior debt issue, shareholders can threaten not to undertake 
new investments, thereby putting pressure on the workers. Thus, it is expected that in such 
circumstances, firms with high leverage are associated with a lower employee pay. 
The strategic use of leverage may serve as a disciplinary mechanism, especially when firms 
with higher free cash flows are likely to increase employee benefits, even if these benefits are not 
creating value for shareholders, thus the increase of debt may prevent managers from diverting 
free cash flow to overinvest in employee benefits, and by doing so it may result in a negative relation 
between leverage and employee benefits (Bae et al., 2011; Hanka, 1998; Jensen, 1986). 
This relation is not observed in the theoretical model presented by Berk et al. (2010), 
according to whom higher leveraged firms will pay higher wages to their employees and by doing 
so it is expected to compensate workers for the unemployment costs that they may face in case of 
bankruptcy. This contrasting theory however does not contradict what is referred by Perotti and 
Spier (1993). In this context, firms can reduce the probability of unionization by paying a wage 
premium to their employees (Berk et al., 2010, and Bronars and Deere, 1991).  
As Chemmanur et al. (2013) point out and according to Perotti and Spier (1993), if workers 
anticipate that firms will use leverage strategically to renegotiate their wages, they will demand 
                                                 
2 According to Dünhaupt (2013), M&A have contributed to the downsizing of firms and this transformation has been accompanied by a reduction in 
the bargaining position of workers. In line with this, there is also the idea presented by Darcillon (2012), based on Black et al. (2007), according to 
whom, M&A operations by its restructuring nature permit the break of long term employment commitments and by doing so we may observe a 
reduction in job tenure. Thus, M&A constitute a way for the equity market to influence labour market flexibility. These operations may serve as a 
restructuring mechanism, thus facilitating the transfer of income from labour to capital by wage cuts or dismissals (Black et al., 2007, 2008). 
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higher wages in order to compensate that potential risk. This hypothesis is also referred by Bae et 
al. (2011) according to whom, distressed firms could have incentives to increase cash flows by 
cutting costs relating to employee benefits, so it is expected that rational employees will demand 
higher wages. Thus, in line with Maksimovic and Titman (1991), reputable firms that are committed 
to providing better employee benefits, need to have lower debt ratios, so in this sense we may 
expect that reputable and safe firms may guarantee employee benefits or even higher wages.  
To reduce bargaining power and the probability of unionization, firms may also pay higher 
wages to their workers in order to discourage the occurrence of union formation. This strategy may 
serve to increase shareholder wealth through the increase in labour costs, as profits are higher 
than in the presence of a union formation (Bronars and Deere, 1991). In fact, firms may support 
higher costs by paying a higher wage, but this higher wage will be not as much as the union wage. 
However, shareholders prefer to reduce bargaining power by using debt to limit the effect of 
unionization, thus diverting cash flows from workers to shareholders. 
Another important issue is that the use of leverage as a bargaining tool may differ according 
to the firm. Therefore, safe firms (that do not face a significant probability of distress) will not be 
able to use leverage as a bargaining tool to reduce employee wages (Perotti and Spier, 1993; 
Chemmanur et al., 2013).  The authors conclude that leverage has a positive and significant effect 
on average employee pay and that the incremental labour costs related to an increase in leverage, 
are large enough to offset the tax benefits that are related with that increase, thus the increase in 
labour costs may limit the use of debt and influence capital structure decisions. They also observe 
that this positive effect is more evident for safe firms, suggesting that for safe firms the disciplining 
effects are not as prevalent as for distressed firms, where the positive relation between leverage 
and employee pay is negative though not significant. As the authors suggest, even in cases where 
firms compensate employees for their human capital risk due to higher leverage, it may be 
observed that ex post firms may use leverage as a bargaining tool to reduce employee wages, thus 
offsetting the previous effect. 
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2.2. Banking governance and stability 
Several transformations were determinant for the emergence of new business models in banking. 
The changing environment in which banking institutions operate, has experienced a deep change 
marked by the financialization of the economy (Azkunaga et al., 2013; Llewellyn, 2013). It is well 
known that the financialization process reflects the increase in importance of the financial sector, 
however, for banking this phenomenon has important consequences in the way in which corporate 
governance is performed and in the banking management models that are implemented.  
Azkunaga et al. (2013) present four arguments that justify the special nature of financial 
services, thus it is important to adapt the general rules of corporate governance to the specificities 
that affect their governance. First, there are opposite interests in terms of risk preferences between 
stakeholders (it can be expected that some stakeholders like depositors or other creditors are more 
risk adverse than shareholders). However, if, and according to contract theory, managers are 
obliged to satisfy shareholders’ interests, then it is expected that they would not attend to other 
stakeholders’ interests. Secondly, managers’ decisions and actions have effects on depositors and 
other contributors, thus it may be the case that some occurrences (good or bad) may affect the 
whole economy in a hasty way. Thirdly, some risks, namely those that affect liquidity or reputation, 
are more evident in the financial sector in comparison to other sectors. Finally, the government 
intervention that may take place in case of the occurrence of a problem, may distort the incentives 
of different participants in the banking business, as these interventions are expected to support the 
entities that are going through the problem. 
Moreover, in line with Cibils and Allami (2013) and Lapavitsas (2009), the transformations 
promoted by financialization are not restricted to non-financial corporations, they are also obvious 
for banks as their profits shifted from production to circulation, since financial sector profits are 
extracted from worker salaries, this is what Lapavitsas (2009) calls financial expropriation. 
As Llewellyn (2013: 335) points out the financialization process has created conditions for an 
over-expansion of the banking activity that is observable in several dimensions, such as: the 
increasing role of banks in financial intermediation; the rapid increase of the banking sector’s 
assets relative to GDP; the magnitude and growth of the financial sector in the economy; the 
increase in trade volumes as well as in share profits of banks, among others.  
In spite of the restructuring of corporations and the reduction of labour costs,  the replacement 
of long-term growth strategies by short-term planning is observed, thus the shortening of the 
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investments’ time frame has given primacy to economic and financial indicators crucial for short-
term profitability (Dünhaupt, 2011; Szunke, 2014). This short-term focus, based on shareholder 
value, has favoured performance and profitability indicators. 
The increasing role of financialization can constitute a destabilizing factor for the banking 
sector. A growing information asymmetry is observed, which can foster the spread of rent-seeking 
which can lead to a breach of trust in the relations between buyer and seller of financial products. 
A process of asset securitization in order to improve indicators or even as a way to manage its 
credit risk, can also be observed. Szunke (2014) also mentions that financialization may enhance 
the banking sector’s instability, as an increasing role of financial institutions and their incomes is 
observed, as well as, an increasing scale of their financial leverage activity. 
Bank corporate governance presents some differences when compared to other companies 
and according to Westman (2009), there are some factors that explain this. First, there is an 
intrinsic relation between corporate governance and banking failure, as well as, market confidence. 
Poor corporate governance may be reflected on the stability of the financial system and this may 
be more dangerous if there is a lack of confidence in banks, which may lead to liquidity crises. 
Furthermore, banking activity is less transparent as it is difficult for outsiders to assess the true 
risk of bank assets and to monitor their operations and the stakeholders involved are wider. As 
several stakeholders are involved, it is difficult to account for a wide range of interests, 
notwithstanding the obligation of accountability to their shareholders and to attend to their interests 
in accordance with the corporate governance principles for banks recognized by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BIS, 2015). Finally, the diversification to other activities, rather 
than traditional banking, has contributed to the increase in risk. Therefore, an appropriate corporate 
governance system is crucial for the effective control of banking activities. 
2.3. Development of hypothesis 
In line with the ideas presented by Bae et al. (2011), Perotti and Spier (1993), Hanka (1988) 
and Jensen (1986) we consider that leverage may be used strategically by firms as a bargaining 
tool, thus it is expected that firms with more debt, pay lower wages. Firms with high debt may 
underinvest in employee benefits, which can be expressed in terms of wage reduction. 
Moreover, following the ideas presented in Perotti and Spier (1993) we consider also that the 
effect of leverage will differ according to the firm, namely the negative effect of leverage will be 
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manifest in distressed banks. In this sense, the workers’ bargaining power is reduced as they are 
more willing to accept lower wages, if the firm presents a potential risk of default. Thus, distressed 
firms are more prone to use leverage as a strategic device to renegotiate wages. 
Based on this theoretical framework we test the following hypothesis: 
H1: Firms with higher leverage will pay lower wages. 
H2: The negative effect of leverage on employee wages increases with the probability of 
financial distress. 
 
3. Data and summary statistics 
In this study we examine a panel of European banks for the 1987-2015 period. We use data on all 
banks from 19 countries that are members of the Euro Area. Information from income statements 
and balance sheet information on individual banks is taken from Bankscope. The Bankscope 
database, provided by Bureau van Dijk, is a unique collection of micro-level banking information 
for different countries. It comprises information on detailed financials which are presented in 
multiple formats, including the universal format to compare banks globally. All data is reported in 
Euro and adjusted by price consumer index inflation in each country. 
The original database includes 123,975 observations and 4,275 banks. After checking and 
clearing for inconsistencies and dropping all banks that are categorized as “Central banks", 
“Specialized governmental credit institutions” and “Multi-lateral governmental banks”, we ended 
up with 121,161 observations and 4,184 banks. Table 1 reports the distribution of observations 
and banks across countries. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the statistics of the variables used in our analysis. Panel A 
contains the statistics using the original dataset, while Panel B contains the variables trimmed at 
the 1st and 99th percentiles in order to control for the influence of outliers. 
For the trimmed sample (panel B) we observe that the mean of average employee pay is 
94,430 euros. The 1% and 99% cut-off is 16,660 euros and 202,330 euros, respectively. The mean 
of return on average assets is 0.47%. 
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Table 1: Sample 
Country 
Total number of 
observations 
Total number of 
banks 
Austria 10173 352 
Belgium 2537 88 
Cyprus 953 33 
Estonia 319 11 
Finland 1740 60 
France 12137 420 
Germany 53429 1844 
Greece 464 16 
Ireland 1939 67 
Italy 18502 638 
Latvia 580 20 
Lithuania 290 10 
Luxembourg 3619 125 
Malta 637 22 
Netherlands 2690 93 
Portugal 4227 146 
Slovakia 667 23 
Slovenia 725 25 
Spain 5533 191 
Total 121161 4184 
of which:   
Bank holdings & Holding companies 2689 93 
Clearing & Custody Institutions 636 22 
Commercial banks 22208 768 
Cooperative banks 47705 1645 
Finance companies 8732 302 
Group finance companies 372 13 
Investment & Trust corporations 1159 40 
Investment banks 3761 130 
Micro-financing institutions 58 2 
Other non-banking credit institutions 1502 52 
Private banking/Asset management 
companies 
2890 100 
Real Estate & Mortgage banks 3428 119 
Savings banks 24371 841 
Securities firms 1650 57 
Source: Computations from the author based on Bankscope (2015) 
Notes: See Appendix A3 (Table A.33) for the definition of the different types of bank specializations according to Bankscope. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
(In thousand euros, unless otherwise expressed) 
Panel A: Original dataset           
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 1st percentile 10th percentile 50th percentile 90th percentile 99th percentile 
Personnel expenses  53079 70,842.15 574,280.64 5.40 16,090,000 300.00 1,300 7,285.35 59,400 1,154,400 
Average personnel expenses 39860 94.43 2,022.43 0.03 214,900 16.66 38.89 54.84 91.84 202.33 
Return on average assets – ROAA (%) 55005 0.57 6.09 -348.07 676.15 -3.77 0.03 0.29 1.15 8.56 
Interest coverage ratio (%) 54945 0.96 8.40 -189.93 1,035.78 -4.38 0.02 0.65 1.73 11.38 
Regulatory tier one capital (%) 14852 15.77 15.61 -101.30 689.10 5.43 8.30 12.97 23.65 62.90 
Liabilities to total assets (%) 55222 90.12 12.84 -38.02 350.62 18.80 84.56 93.40 96.29 99.18 
Total assets 55247 9,470,601 7.83e+07 18.30 2.59e+09 14,700 89,400 579,500 7,109,500 1.62e+08 
Business diversification 54447 30.76 34.90 -950.00 934.23 -27.23 12.50 25.34 64.29 104.35 
Employee productivity 40167 42.18 3271.53 -426550 194000 -200.00 1.36 10.98 74.24 914.29 
           
Panel B: Trimmed dataset           
Personnel expenses  53,079      70,842.15 574,280.64 5.40 16,090,000 300 1,300 7,285.35 59,400 1,154,400 
Average personnel expenses 39,860          94.43 2,022.43 0.03 214,900 16.66 38.89 54.84 91.84 202.33 
Return on average assets – ROAA (%) 53,905          0.47 0.90 -3.77 8.56 -1.73 0.04 0.29 1.09 4.55 
Interest coverage ratio (%) 53,846           0.81 1.19 -4.38 11.37 -2.12 0.04 0.65 1.65 5.92 
Regulatory tier one capital (%) 14,557          14.86 7.38 5.43 62.90 6.20 8.44 12.97 23.00 45.74 
Liabilities to total assets (%) 54,118           90.83 9.65 18.80 99.18 38.46 85.27 93.40 96.21 98.39 
Total assets 54,145   3,497,880 1.20e+07 14,700 1.62e+08 27,100 95,400 579,400 6,282,100 6.27e+07 
Business diversification 53,359          30.78 21.35 -27.23 104.35 -7.41 13.30 25.34 60.78 99.89 
Employee productivity 39,370         30.10 77.09 -200.00 914.29 -81.81 1.74 10.98 68.97 417.57 
Source: Computations from the author based on Bankscope (2015). 
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The interest coverage ratio, the regulatory tier one capital and the liabilities to total assets have a 
mean of 0.81%, 14.86%, and 90.83%, and a median of 0.65%, 12.97%, and 93.40%, respectively. 
We have also observed, that the mean of net income to gross revenue which expresses our 
business diversification variable is 31% and that the average contribution of labour to net earnings is 
about 30%. Total assets have a wide range, from approximately 15 million euros to 162,000 million 
euros. 
4. Empirical model 
4.1. Estimation strategy  
Focusing on financialization and changes in corporate governance, we estimate the effect of firm 
leverage on wages. The baseline specification is given by: 
𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 
+ 𝛽4 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡 +  𝛾𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡                 (1) 
where 𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑐,𝑡  is the logarithm of average employee pay of firm i, in country c, at time (year) t, and it 
is calculated as the natural logarithm of average labour expenses.  
The firms’ leverage is related to financialization, as firms may use debt as a bargaining tool. Three 
alternative measures are used in our specification: first, regulatory tier one capital ratio which includes 
all capital that is defined as Tier 1 by the regulator and it comprises regulatory tier 1 capital, divided 
by risk weighted assets. It measures whether the pool of permanent funds available to the bank is 
sufficient to neutralize the risks. Second, the ratio of liabilities to total assets examines how much of 
a firm’s assets are made of liabilities, as this ratio shows how leveraged the company is with debt, 
thus firms with higher liabilities to total assets ratios should have high financing and debt service costs, 
than firms with lower ratios. 
As a third measure of leverage, we have also included the interest coverage ratio, constructed as 
the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) to interests’ expense. The inclusion of the 
interest coverage ratio tries to consider that leverage may be seen as a means of transferring control 
from shareholders to bondholders (Rajan and Zingales, 1995), so a flow measure would be more 
appropriate to assess if the firm is able to meet its fixed payments and to measure the impact of the 
debt on the riskiness of the firm. A high interest coverage ratio, in terms of profitability, indicates that 
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the firm will be capable of paying interests owed, even in difficult times. A low ratio indicates that a 
small decrease in income will put the firm at risk, as it will not be able to pay the interests which are 
owed (Bierman, 2003: 83). 
We consider profitability as a measure of value creation and performance. A widely used 
performance indicator is the return on average assets (ROAA) that permits the identification of the 
returns generated from the bank’s assets. This ratio expresses how profitable a company is, relative 
to its total assets and how efficient management is at using its assets to generate earnings. In view of 
a profit maximizing behaviour, a negative effect of these variables on employee pay is expected, as 
labour costs are inversely related to profit.  
As larger firms tend to pay higher wages to their employees, we have considered the employer-
size wage effect (Brown and Medoff, 1989) and we have included the bank-size measure as the natural 
logarithm of total assets, in order to consider the positive correlation between firm size and wages. In 
line with Schoar (2002), diversification may be seen as a value destroying strategy accompanied by 
rent dissipation, through higher wages to workers, thus we include business diversification, computed 
as non-interest income, divided by gross revenue. In order to control for the contribution of labour to 
the net earnings, we have also included employee productivity calculated as the logarithm of net 
income, divided by the number of employees. As has been referred by Koch and Scott (2015: 173), 
this indicator expresses the productivity and profitability of a bank´s workforce. In a value enhancing 
strategy, if workers participate on the firm’s profitability, this will be positively reflected on their wages. 
Finally, the model includes country-time interaction dummies, 𝛾𝑐𝑡 , to control for macroeconomic 
shocks specific to the country. 
Some concerns may arise from the estimations above as, for instance, consider that wages are 
negotiated in the beginning of the year, thus to assess the effects of the explanatory variables on wages 
we need to take into account their lagged values. In order to consider this issue and to lower the 
potential endogeneity, we re-estimate our model using our explanatory variables lagged by one year.  
The use of a panel dataset imposes some restrictions in our linear model, namely the assumption 
of independence among observations. Moreover, we can use the panel data structure and deal with 
panel data endogeneity. As banks are repeatedly observed along subsequent years, we control for 
time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity by including bank-specific effects, 𝛼𝑖, that will reveal, for 
instance, differences that may be reflected on wages or management policies, and we have also 
included, country-time interaction dummies,  𝛾𝑐𝑡, to control for macroeconomic shocks specific to the 
country. 
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𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 
+ 𝛽4 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡                    (2) 
4.2. Distressed versus non-distressed banks 
The effects of leverage could be different for safe banks comparing to distressed banks, thus as 
Chemmanur et al. (2013) propose it would be interesting to disentangle the leverage effects on 
employee pay, according to the type of bank. For the prediction of bankruptcy, we use the Z-score as 
a measure of individual bank risk. Specifically, it indicates the number of standard deviations below 
the expected value of a bank’s return on assets at which equity is depleted and the bank is insolvent 
(Boyd et al., 1993). 
The Z-score has been frequently used to measure bank risk as it is related to the probability of a 
bank’s insolvency (Bhagat et al., 2015; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2012; Hesse and Čihák, 2007; 
Köhler, 2015; Laeven and Levine, 2009). The simplicity of its application and the fact that it can be 
constructed by only using accounting data, are referred as the main advantages of this measure. Also, 
it is possible to compare the risk of default in different groups of institutions, however it does not 
represent a truly aggregate measure of financial stability as it does not take into consideration the 
potential effects of a bank’s default into other banks. Nevertheless, the purpose is to evaluate each 
institution separately, in order to distinguish between those that could incur in a situation of financial 
distress, therefore, for this goal, the Z-score seems adequate. 
The traditional concept of Z-score is defined as the ratio of the mean of return to assets (𝜇𝑅𝑂𝐴) 
plus the capital ratio (𝐶𝐴𝑅), divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets (𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴).  
𝑍 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  
𝜇𝑅𝑂𝐴+𝐶𝐴𝑅
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
,                                                (3) 
If we define bank insolvency as a condition where (𝐶𝐴𝑅 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴) ≤ 0, then we can obtain the 
individual bank’s probability of insolvency as 𝑝(𝑅𝑂𝐴 ≤ −𝐶𝐴𝑅). Thus, if  𝑅𝑂𝐴 is a random variable 
with mean 𝜇𝑅𝑂𝐴 and finite variance 𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
2  an upper bound of the probability of insolvency can be 
estimated as 
 
𝑝(𝑅𝑂𝐴 ≤ −𝐶𝐴𝑅) ≤ 𝑍−2                                           (4) 
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         where  𝑍 ≡  
𝜇𝑅𝑂𝐴 +𝐶𝐴𝑅
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
> 0                                            (5) 
The Z-score obtained in expression (3) presents an appropriate estimate of a bank’s probability 
of insolvency, as if μ is not normally distributed, and in accordance to Hannan and Hanweck (1988), 
Boyd et al. (1993) and Boyd and Runkle (1993), based on the Bienaymé-Tchebycheff inequality, 𝑍 is 
the inverse measure of the upper bound of the probability of insolvency. 
In spite of its wide use on banking literature, its application as a time varying-measure in panel 
studies has contributed to the discussion about the best way for the construction of this measure. 
Lepetit and Strobel (2013) present a comparison of different approaches for the construction of Z-
score measures. One of the presented approaches is the one adopted by Hesse and Čihák (2007), 
which was also implemented by Köhler (2015).  According to Lepetit and Strobel (2013: 9) this 
approach allows the construction of time-varying Z-scores that are available over the full sample and 
it represents a clear and simple method, making Z-scores measures practical to implement in the 
banking and financial literature.  
Following this approach our Z-score measure is defined as the ratio of the return to assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴) 
plus the capital asset ratio (𝐶𝐴𝑅) divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets (𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴) 
over the entire sample period, 
                           𝑍𝑖𝑡 =
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡+𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
 ,                                                  (6) 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐴 is the return on assets and 𝐶𝐴𝑅 the ratio of total equity over total assets of bank in 
year t. 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐴 is a bank´s standard deviation from 𝑅𝑂𝐴. The standard deviation of returns is 
calculated for the entire sample period, to obtain a sufficiently long-term view of the risks faced by a 
given bank. A higher Z-score means that banks are more stable and present a lower probability of 
bankruptcy.  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the Z-score and its components for the full sample. A 
preliminary look at the z-scores suggests a high variability in the sample, with a z-score varying from -
2.78 to 23573.36 with an average of 55.12.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the z-score and its components 
 Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
ROA (%) 0.47 0.90 -348.07 8.56 
CAR (%) 9.17 9.65 0.82 81.20 
SDROA (%) 0.49 0.65 0.00 7.35 
Z-score 55.12 200.65 -2.78 23,573.36 
Source: Computations from the author based on Bankscope (2015). 
Notes: The variables were trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
In order to observe the subsample of distressed banks, we have defined distressed banks as 
those with z-scores that fall in the lowest 10 percent of the distribution6. For our sample, banks with a 
z-score below 8.96 are considered distressed. We have estimated our regression, including a dummy 
variable taking the value of one if the bank is distressed and zero if the bank is safe, and we have 
included an interaction term between the variables 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 and 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒. The interaction between 
these two variables will allow us to assess if there is any distinctive feature for distressed banks in the 
relation between leverage and employee pay. 
𝐸𝑃𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡 +  
+ 𝛽4 𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡 +             
+ 𝛽7𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 × 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡                                                            (7) 
As reported in Subsection 4.1, we include the lagged values of the explanatory variables. 
Furthermore, we control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, including bank-specific effects in 
our regression. 
4.3. Instrumental Variable Analysis 
Considering that leverage may be endogenous, in the sense that high wages can also imply low 
leverage, we address this potential reverse causality concern by employing an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach. Notwithstanding that this problem may already be partially out, by the use of lagged 
values in equation (2), we consider as suggested by Reed (2015) that replacing contemporaneous 
lagged variables with its lagged values, may not adequately address the problem associated with 
simultaneity, however the use of lagged values as instruments may be an effective estimation strategy. 
In this sense, the instrumental variables fixed effects estimation with two-stages least squares (IV2SLS) 
approach is applied.  
                                                 
6 In accordance with the International Monetary Fund (2013). 
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Bearing in mind that there is a natural source of instruments in terms of predetermined variables 
(Wooldridge, 2009), the availability of information about previous realizations of the variables of 
interest provides potential instruments, and by doing so it is possible to isolate the effect of exogenous 
changes in leverage on wages, as the instruments are correlated with the explanatory variable, but 
they will not be correlated with the error term at time t, since they were generated at an earlier point 
in time. In this context, the second and third lags of leverage are used as instruments for our 
endogenous variable, which in our case is the first lag of liabilities to total assets.  
In order to assess the robustness of our IV estimates, we employ an alternative identification 
strategy proposed by Lewbel (2012)7 for the construction of instruments as functions of the model’s 
data.  
To understand the basic framework of the method proposed by Lewbel (2012), consider 𝑌1 and 
𝑌2 as observed endogenous variables, X as a vector of observed exogenous regressors, and 𝜀 =
(𝜀1, 𝜀2) as unobserved error processes, where the structural model can be defined as 
𝑌1 = 𝑿′𝛽1 +  𝑌2𝛾1 + 𝜀1 
(8) 
𝑌2 = 𝑿′𝛽2 +  𝑌1𝛾2 +  𝜀2, 
 
Lewbel (2012) suggests that, in the presence of some heteroscedasticity, one can take a vector 
Z of observed exogenous variables and use [𝑍 − 𝐸(𝑍)]𝜀2 as an instrument if 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑿, 𝜀𝑖
2) ≠ 0, 𝑖 =
1,2 and 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝒁, 𝜀1𝜀2) = 0 and Z could be a subset of X or equal to X. In this sense, no information 
outside the model is required. The generated instruments are constructed from the first-stage equation 
residuals, multiplied by each of the included exogenous variables in mean-centered form  
      𝑍𝑗 = (𝑋𝑗 −  𝑋𝑗)𝜀̂,                                                   (9) 
 
where 𝜀̂ is the vector of residuals from the first-stage regression of each endogenous regressor on all 
regressors, including a constant vector.  
Once the above set of instruments is obtained, it is possible to use two-stage least squares to 
estimate the IV regression, as a standard IV estimation. Moreover, Lewbel (2012) suggests that in 
cases where there is an external instrument it is possible to estimate by TSLS using the second and 
third lags of leverage (our instruments) and the generated instruments. In this case, there will be three 
sets of estimates: the traditional IV estimates, estimates using only generated instruments, and 
estimates using both generated and excluded instruments.  
                                                 
7 This method is implemented by stata using the Stata module ivreg2h (Baum and Schaffer, 2012). 
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5. Empirical Results  
5.1. Relation between leverage and employee pay 
We depart from a baseline specification to estimate the effect of firm leverage on wages, in which we 
include variables that characterize firm size, business diversification and employee productivity, as 
well as variables that control for bank profitability and a set of dummies that control for macroeconomic 
shocks specific to the country. As previously mentioned, we use three alternative measures of leverage 
– regulatory tier one capital ratio, liabilities to total assets and interest coverage ratio.  
In our baseline model, we start with OLS regressions of average employee pay for all the sample. 
Considering the endogeneity issue, and in an attempt to deal with it, we estimate our model using our 
explanatory variables lagged by one year. In addition, to control for heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation between banks, the standard errors are robust and clustered at the bank level. The results 
from estimating equation (1) with lagged effects are reported in Table 4. 
We find that profitability is inversely related to employee pay. This inverse relationship is expected, 
as the increase in labour costs will reduce profit, thus invalidating any profit-maximization strategy. 
Considering that our employee pay variable is by construction related to personnel costs, this relation 
is manifest.  
The positive coefficient for business diversification reflects that employee pay is positively related 
to firm’s diversification, thus workers benefit from this strategy.  It is also observed that productivity 
affects average wages positively. The effect suggested by the literature that larger firms tend to pay 
more to their employees is not clear in all the specifications, a significant but negative effect is 
observed in column (1) for the specification that uses the interest coverage ratio. 
The coefficients for the two alternative measures of leverage – regulatory tier one capital and 
liabilities to total assets – suggest a negative relation between leverage and employee pay. It is 
observed that banks with lower leverage, pay higher wages. For the interest coverage ratio, the results 
suggest that there is a positive effect of leverage on average wages for a significance level of 10%. 
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Table 4: Ordinary Least Square regressions of average employee pay  
(with lagged effects) 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of average employee pay 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Interest coverage ratio (t-1) -1.167*   
 (0.598)   
Regulatory tier one capital (t-1)  0.301***  
  (0.075)  
Liabilities to total assets (t-1)   -0.411*** 
   (0.082) 
Return on average assets (t-1) -4.246*** -10.430*** -6.969*** 
 (1.177) (2.089) (1.153) 
Total assets (t-1) -0.006** 0.004 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Business diversification (t-1) 0.497*** 0.424*** 0.485*** 
 (0.037) (0.056) (0.038) 
Employee productivity (t-1) 0.134*** 0.128*** 0.133*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) 
Constant 3.645*** 3.462*** 3.974*** 
 (0.076) (0.098) (0.102) 
Observations 29,971 9,397 29,898 
R-squared 0.576 0.624 0.579 
RMSE 0.242 0.218 0.239 
F-stat 22155 13463 5652 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Source: Computations from the author. 
Notes: (1) The regression includes country-time interaction dummies to control for macroeconomic shocks specific to the 
country. (2) All explanatory variables were trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. (3) Robust standard errors in brackets, 
clustered at the firm level. (4) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
Controlling for both bank and year effects and with the explanatory variables lagged by one year, 
we observe from Table 5 that, as expected, when we control for unobserved heterogeneity, the wage 
variation explained by the regressors is reduced. Specifically, it is observed that employee pay is 
positively related to the firm’s employee productivity and that profitability is inversely related with 
employee average wage. Moreover, there is no evidence of a size-wage premium effect, as the 
coefficient of total assets suggests a negative effect of size on wages. With respect to business 
diversification its coefficient is insignificant throughout the specifications.  
We observe that leverage is statistically significant, thus suggesting a negative relation between 
leverage and average wages, but only when considering the specification that uses liabilities to total 
assets as a measure of leverage, as observed in column (3).  
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Table 5: Fixed effects regressions of average employee pay (with lagged effects) 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of average employee pay 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Interest coverage ratio (t-1) 0.325   
 (0.260)   
Regulatory tier one capital (t-1)  0.045  
  (0.111)  
Liabilities to total assets (t-1)   -0.230*** 
   (0.066) 
Return on average assets (t-1) -2.259*** -1.876 -2.526*** 
 (0.670) (1.520) (0.758) 
Total assets (t-1) -0.038*** -0.011 -0.024*** 
 (0.008) (0.021) (0.008) 
Business diversification (t-1) 0.038 -0.011 0.041 
 (0.028) (0.042) (0.028) 
Employee productivity (t-1) 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
Constant 4.593*** 4.286*** 4.608*** 
 (0.112) (0.279) (0.111) 
Observations 29,971 9,397 29,898 
R-squared 0.361 0.409 0.362 
F-stat 340.2 2.399e+06 160.5 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Banks 3,471 2,499 3,460 
Source: Computations from the author. 
Notes: (1) The regression includes country-time interaction dummies to control for macroeconomic shocks specific to the 
country. (2) All explanatory variables were trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. (3) Robust standard errors in brackets, 
clustered at the firm level.  (4) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
5.2. Distressed versus non-distressed banks 
Table 6 reports the results from estimating equation (4.7). Taking into consideration that our variable 
of interest is the interaction between 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 and 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒, the estimations with the explanatory 
variables lagged by one year, suggest that for banks financially distressed, the magnitude of the effect 
of leverage is not different in comparison to non-distressed banks, except for the case of the 
specification that uses the regulatory tier one capital as a measure of  leverage, whose coefficient for 
the interaction term is positive but only at a 10% level of significance, thus suggesting that the negative 
effect of leverage on wages can be more pronounced for distressed firms. 
The estimations of our fixed effects model with the explanatory variables lagged by one year are 
presented in Table 7. From the results, we can conclude that there are no differences on the effects 
of leverage on average wages for distressed banks and safe banks. 
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Table 6: Ordinary Least Square regressions of average employee pay for distressed banks (with lagged 
effects) 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of average employee pay 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Interest coverage ratio (t-1) -1.260**   
 (0.603)   
Regulatory tier one capital (t-1)  0.299***  
  (0.070)  
Liabilities to total assets (t-1)   -0.448*** 
   (0.083) 
Distress 0.074*** -0.008 0.201 
 (0.022) (0.046) (0.331) 
Distress* Interest coverage ratio (t-1) 0.864   
 (1.818)   
Distress*Regulatory tier one capital (t-1)  0.685*  
  (0.353)  
Distress*Liabilities to total assets (t-1)   -0.109 
   (0.355) 
Return on average assets (t-1) -5.960*** -11.944*** -8.627*** 
 (1.209) (2.170) (1.185) 
Total assets (t-1) -0.008*** 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Business diversification (t-1) 0.474*** 0.388*** 0.459*** 
 (0.037) (0.056) (0.037) 
Employee productivity (t-1) 0.136*** 0.131*** 0.135*** 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) 
Constant 3.670*** 3.473*** 4.019*** 
 (0.077) (0.098) (0.101) 
Observations 29,743 9,360 29,757 
R-squared 0.584 0.628 0.586 
RMSE 0.234 0.212 0.234 
F-stat 6272 465765 4730 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Source: Computations from the author. 
Notes: (1) The regression includes country-time interaction dummies to control for macroeconomic shocks specific to the country. (2) 
Distress is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the bank is distressed and zero if the bank is safe. (3) All explanatory variables 
were trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. (4) Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the firm level. (4) *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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Table 7: Fixed effects regressions of average employee pay for distressed banks 
(with lagged effects) 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of average employee pay 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Interest coverage ratio (t-1) 0.370   
 (0.248)   
Regulatory tier one capital (t-1)  0.072  
  (0.083)  
Liabilities to total assets (t-1)   -0.207*** 
   (0.068) 
Distress -0.032** 0.012 -0.184 
 (0.014) (0.039) (0.153) 
Distress* Interest coverage ratio (t-1) -0.270   
 (0.581)   
Distress*Regulatory tier one capital (t-1)  -0.206  
  (0.210)  
Distress*Liabilities to total assets (t-1)   0.163 
   (0.164) 
Return on average assets (t-1) -2.821*** -1.025 -3.148*** 
 (0.710) (0.994) (0.815) 
Total assets (t-1) -0.033*** 0.007 -0.025*** 
 (0.008) (0.023) (0.008) 
Business diversification (t-1) 0.023 -0.029 0.034 
 (0.028) (0.039) (0.029) 
Employee productivity (t-1) 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.032*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Constant 4.538*** 4.047*** 4.616*** 
 (0.107) (0.317) (0.114) 
Observations 29,743 9,360 29,757 
R-squared 0.368 0.373 0.366 
F-stat 865.7 3.680e+06 4365 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Banks 3,427 2,495 3,430 
Source: Computations from the author. 
Notes: (1) The regression includes country-time interaction dummies to control for macroeconomic shocks specific to the country. (2) 
All explanatory variables were trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. (3) Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the firm 
level. (4) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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6. Robustness tests and additional results 
In this section, we perform alternative specifications in order to further validate our findings. First, we 
test the inverse relation between leverage and employee pay for alternative sub-samples. Furthermore, 
an additional control test was performed with the inclusion of the financial crisis. Second, we 
reestimate our model, taking into account the non-linear effect of leverage on wages. Third, bearing in 
mind that the use of lagged values, as suggested by Reed (2015), may not adequately address some 
potential endogeneity problem, we employ an IV approach. 
6.1. Subsamples 
Considering that our sample presents several types of banks, we have restricted our sample and 
estimate equation (2) for the sub-samples of banks operating in two distinct business models: 
shareholder-oriented banks and stakeholder-oriented banks. In line with Ferri et al. (2015), 
organizational form has important implications on financial firms. Besides commercial banks, whose 
explicit goal is the maximization of profits, which means shareholder value, other banks such as 
cooperative and savings banks aim to maximize the value for stakeholders.  
Concerning commercial banks, we consider, as Ferri et al. (2015), a broad category of 
commercial banks, which includes commercial and investment banks as well as private banking and 
asset management companies. In this broader category of commercial banks, we have also included 
bank holdings and holding (BHH) companies. However, since BHH companies are defined by 
Bankscope as holding companies of bank groups, which usually have very limited business activities, 
we have also estimated equation (2) for the sub-samples of shareholder-oriented banks, excluding this 
type of banks.  
The results presented in Table 8 validate our previous findings; we observe that the results remain 
almost qualitatively the same, confirming the negative effect of leverage on average employee pay for 
shareholder-oriented banks. In the case of stakeholder-oriented banks the coefficient of leverage is not 
statistically significant; suggesting that for these banks leverage has no effect on wages. 
We have also considered the occurrence of the financial crisis during our sample period and we 
have tried to further assess, if the effect of leverage on wages is the same during that period. We have 
reestimated equation (2) including a dummy variable (Crisis) for the financial crisis, that is one for 
2008 and 2009, and zero for the previous and subsequent years of the sample. 
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It is observed, from Table 9, that the coefficient of liabilities to total assets remains negative and 
significant, and that this effect is positive in the years during the crisis, 2008 and 2009, as suggested 
by the coefficient on the interaction term; however, the differential is not statistically significant. 
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Table 8: Fixed effects regressions of average employee pay (sub-samples) 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of average employee pay 
 
Shareholder-oriented 
Stakeholder- 
-oriented 
 Bank holdings & holdings companies, commercial 
and investment banks, and private banking/asset 
management companies 
Bank holdings & holdings 
companies and commercial 
banks 
Commercial and investment banks, and 
private banking/asset management 
companies 
Commercial 
banks 
Savings and 
cooperative banks 
Liabilities to total assets 
(t-1) 
-0.274*** -0.242*** -0.240*** -0.243*** -0.287 
(0.088) (0.090) (0.085) (0.089) (0.221) 
Return on average 
assets (t-1) 
-3.772*** -3.806** -2.673** -1.988** -5.087*** 
(1.365) (1.507) (1.147) (0.970) (1.277) 
Total assets (t-1) -0.018 -0.030* -0.014 -0.020 -0.030*** 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.009) 
Business diversification 
(t-1) 
0.103** 0.117* 0.097** 0.118** 0.011 
(0.051) (0.064) (0.038) (0.047) (0.027) 
Employee productivity 
(t-1) 
0.044*** 0.048*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.036*** 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
Constant 4.711*** 4.794*** 4.681*** 4.712*** 4.672*** 
(0.197) (0.229) (0.193) (0.228) (0.239) 
Observations 5,367 4,338 5,133 4,104 22,648 
R-squared 0.351 0.391 0.389 0.414 0.433 
F-stat 55.73 17107 224.5 924.3 103.8 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Banks 796 636 742 582 2,309 
Source: Computations from the author. 
Notes: (1) The regression includes country-time interaction dummies to control for macroeconomic shocks specific to the country. (2) All explanatory variables were trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. (3) Robust 
standard errors in brackets, clustered at the firm level. (4) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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Table 9: Fixed effects regressions of average employee pay (sub-samples) 
Variable Financial Crisis 
Liabilities to total assets (t-1) -0.249*** 
 (0.067) 
Crisis -0.214*** 
 (0.063) 
Crisis*Liabilities to total assets (t-1) 0.127** 
 (0.063) 
Return on average assets (t-1) -2.488*** 
 (0.755) 
Total assets (t-1) -0.023*** 
 (0.008) 
Business diversification (t-1) 0.039 
 (0.028) 
Employee productivity (t-1) 0.031*** 
 (0.005) 
Constant 4.624*** 
 (0.111) 
Observations 29,898 
R-squared 0.362 
F-stat 136.1 
Prob>F 0.000 
Banks 3,460 
Source: Computations from the author. 
Notes: (1) The regression includes country-time interaction dummies to control for macroeconomic 
shocks specific to the country. (2) Crisis is a dummy variable equal to one for 2008 and 2009, and 
zero for the previous and subsequent years of the sample. (3) All explanatory variables were trimmed 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. (4) Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the bank level. 
(5) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
6.2. Non-linear relationship between leverage and employee pay  
In order to try to account for some potential nonlinear relationship between leverage and employee 
pay, we apply a polynomial regression model as an extension of our model identified in equation (2), 
thus enabling a more effective and flexible curve fitting procedure. 
Considering that a polynomial may provide a good approximation, we estimate a quartic 
polynomial regression assuming non-linear leverage effects and try to plot the relationship between 
leverage and employee pay for different levels of leverage. 
In seeking to understand how the response varies as leverage changes, we may use our fixed-
effects model, regressing average wages on leverage and its non-linear terms, controlling for 
profitability, size, business diversification, and employee productivity and try to assess for different 
levels of leverage, how the effect of leverage on wages changes as leverage changes. 
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Figure 1: Average marginal effects of leverage 
 
Source: Computations from the author. 
Notes: Average marginal effects calculated with a 95% confidence interval. 
The presence of non-linearities in the effect of leverage on wages is observed. Notwithstanding, 
for lower and higher levels of leverage, the effects on wages are not apparent; the average marginal 
effects are significant for values of leverage between 53% and 83%. This reflects that a unit change in 
liabilities to total assets has a different impact according to where this change happens. Therefore, for 
instance, we may observe that for a ratio of liabilities to total assets of 53%, it is estimated a marginal 
effect of 0.30%, thus indicating that at this value, a 1 p.p. increase in leverage will decrease wages by 
0.30%, but for a ratio of liabilities to total assets of 68% the expected decrease in wages, when leverage 
increases 1 p.p., will be of 0.45%, as stated in Figure 1 for the lower value of the curve.  
The relation between leverage and employee pay reveals a threshold effect. This suggests that 
for certain levels of debt there will be a constraint in wages to competitive levels, thus further increases 
have no additional effects on wages. 
6.3. Instrumental variable results 
As previously mentioned, we also address the potential endogeneity problem by using the IV2SLS 
approach. We instrument the first lag of liabilities to total assets, by using the second and third lags 
of the referred variable. The results from the IV first-stage regression are presented in Table 10.  
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Table 10: First-stage regression 
Dependent variable: Liabilities to total assets (t-1) 
Excluded Instruments FE 
Liabilities to total assets (t-2) 0.575*** 
 (0.059) 
Liabilities to total assets (t-3) 0.054 
 (0.040) 
Observations 26,872 
Number of banks 2,972 
First stage F-statistic 100.46*** 
Source: Computations from the author. 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the 
bank level. (2) The table reports only the coefficient estimates for 
the instruments. (3) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%. 
 As expected, these results show that the previous lagged values, namely the second and third 
lags of liabilities to total assets, are positively related with the instrumented variable, notwithstanding 
that the third lag is not significant. 
As we can see the F-statistic of exogenous instruments is clearly high and goes above the rule of 
thumb value of 10 for non-weak instruments, thus validating the instruments proposed. Moreover, 
according to Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002), who developed weak-instrument threshold critical values 
of F for testing that instruments are weak, in the case of two instruments, the suggested critical value 
is of 11.59, therefore the instruments will be considered weak if the first-stage F-statistic falls below 
that critical value. Therefore, the results confirm the validity of the instruments proposed. 
Table 11 presents the results from the second stage of the instrumental variables fixed effects 
estimation. We are also presenting the results obtained from OLS and fixed effects estimation, which 
were reported before on Table 4 and Table 5. 
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Table 11: Instrumental variable regression 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of average employee pay 
Variable OLS FE IV-FE 
Liabilities to total assets (t-1) -0.411*** -0.230*** -0.444*** 
 (0.082) (0.066) (0.139) 
Return on average assets (t-1) -6.969*** -2.526*** -3.874*** 
 (1.153) (0.758) (0.912) 
Total assets (t-1) -0.003 -0.024*** 0.008 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) 
Business diversification (t-1) 0.485*** 0.041 0.059* 
 (0.038) (0.028) (0.035) 
Employee productivity (t-1) 0.133*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 3.974*** 4.608***  
 (0.102) (0.111)  
Observations 29,898 29,898 26,872 
Number of banks  3,460 2,972 
Hansen J   0.159 
p-value   0.690 
Source: Computations from the author. 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the bank level. (2) 
All explanatory variables were trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. (3) OLS 
and FE regressions include country-time interaction dummies to control for 
macroeconomic shocks specific to the country. (4) *significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
In the second stage analysis, banks’ leverage is negatively related with average employee pay, 
consistent with the results from our previous estimations. In this sense, even after accounting for the 
potential endogeneity of leverage, this variable is significant in the determination of average wages. 
Moreover, the estimates for the remaining variables are also consistent with our previous findings. 
In order to increase the robustness of our results, we have employed an alternative approach to 
our standard IV method proposed by Lewbel (2012). As previously mentioned, this approach allows 
us to construct additional instruments as simple functions of the regressors. 
One condition for the implementation of this procedure relies on the existence of 
heteroscedasticity in the data. In order to assess if there is variance in the error term over time, the 
modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity was used, rejecting the null of constant variance.  
Table 12 reports IV estimates using the Lewbel’s method. The diagnostic tests suggest that 
instruments are valid. We observe that the F-test of exogenous instruments and the Hansen 
overidentifying restriction test confirms the validity of our instruments. Finally, the p-value of the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic rejects the null of model underidentification. 
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Table 12: Lewbel’s instrumental variable regression 
First stage regression 
Dependent variable: Liabilities to total assets (t-1) 
 Standard IV Lewbel IV 
(generated 
instruments) 
Standard and Lewbel IV 
(standard plus generated 
instruments)  
Variable    
Liabilities to total assets (t-2) 0.575***  0.547*** 
 (0.059)  (0.055) 
Liabilities to total assets (t-3) 0.054  0.016 
 (0.040)  (0.041) 
Return on average assets (t-1) -1.100*** -1.706*** -1.036*** 
 (0.146) (0.205) (0.136) 
Total assets (t-1) 0.022*** 0.036*** 0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Business diversification (t-1) 0.010** 0.101 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
Employee productivity (t-1) 0.001 0.002** 0.0003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) 
Second stage regression 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of average employee pay 
Variable    
Liabilities to total assets (t-1) -0.444*** -0.165 -0.410*** 
 (0.139) (0.251) (0.130) 
Return on average assets (t-1) -3.874*** -3.353*** -3.810*** 
 (0.912) (1.146) (0.934) 
Total assets (t-1) 0.008 0.002 0.007 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) 
Business diversification (t-1) 0.059* 0.054 0.058* 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Employee productivity (t-1) 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Observations 27,138 27,138 27,138 
Number of banks 3,238 3,238 3,238 
First stage F-statistic 100.47*** 16.29*** 55.61*** 
Underidentification test     
Kleibergen-Paap (χ2) 51.79 71.19 111.63 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Overidentification test    
Hansen J (χ2) 0.159 28.774 41.083 
p-value 0.690 0.321 0.053 
Source: Computations from the author. 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the bank level. (2) All explanatory variables were trimmed at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. (3) The regression includes country-time interaction dummies to control for macroeconomic shocks specific to the 
country. (4) *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. 
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The results show that the Lewbel’s IV results are lower in comparison to the standard IV 
estimates. We have also observed that there are minor differences between the estimates produced 
by the standard IV and those from the estimation that uses both generated and excluded instruments, 
thus the combination of instruments presents results that are closer to the estimates from the standard 
IV. 
In addition, one limitation of the Lewbel’s IV approach is that the estimation will present larger 
standard errors than those presented in the standard IV, thus in the presence of valid and strong 
instruments the standard IV is preferable. However, Lewbel’s approach allows us to check the 
robustness of our standard IV, providing further evidence. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analysed the relationship between wages, shareholder value and leverage for a 
panel of European banks for the 1987-2015 period. We have used data on all banks from 19 countries 
of the Euro Area, whose information is available on Bankscope. 
We have observed that for all the specifications the effect of leverage on average wages differs 
according to the leverage measure that is used. When we consider as an alternative measure of 
leverage, the interest coverage ratio and liabilities to total assets, the results suggest a negative effect, 
thus indicating that banks with more leverage pay lower wages, however with a higher level of 
significance in the case of the liabilities to total assets. On the contrary, the same effect does not hold 
for the regulatory tier one capital. For this specification, the results suggest a significant and positive 
effect of leverage on average wages.  
Controlling for both firm and year effects, the results suggest a negative relation between leverage 
and average wages, which is only statistically significant for the variable liabilities to total assets.   
The contradictory effect that is observed when using the interest coverage ratio, may be motivated 
by the fact that this variable is a flow measure, so it is different in its nature when compared to 
regulatory tier one capital or to liabilities to total assets. On the other hand, we consider that the 
specification that uses regulatory tier one capital as leverage measure must be perceived with caution, 
as the observations that are considered are almost one third of the observations used in other 
specifications. Furthermore, we consider the liabilities to total assets an adequate measure of leverage. 
Our instrumental variable specification validates our baseline results, suggesting that the 
relationship between leverage and average wages remains significant even after instrumenting a 
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bank´s leverage, thus we can conclude that the negative relation is not driven by endogeneity bias. In 
addition, the alternative Lewbel’s IV estimation provides additional support to our findings. In this 
sense, we may say that, as proposed by Perotti and Spier (1993), banks may use their capital structure 
strategically, thus leveraged banks may renegotiate labour contracts and reduce wages. The 
substitution of equity by debt will function as a pressure mechanism for workers, as new investment 
may not occur, thus leading them to accept lower wages. 
It may be the case that banks may also pay higher wages to their workers in order to persuade 
them from forming unions (Berk et al., 2010 and Bronars and Deere, 1991), however our results do 
not allow us to reach this conclusion, since we do not have information about unionization. 
Finally, our paper indicates that for distressed banks, leverage is also statistically significant, when 
related to average wages, thus confirming the inverse relationship between leverage and average 
wages. Furthermore, we have not found evidence that the effect of leverage on average wages differs 
according to the type of bank.  
In this sense, we share the same point of view as Chemmanur et al. (2013), based on Perotti 
and Spier (1993), according to whom, notwithstanding that the disciplining effect of debt on labour 
may be more evident in distressed firms, the disciplining mechanism can also be present in other 
firms, namely safe firms. 
Moreover, the results validate our previous findings when we consider additional alternative 
specifications. First, considering that the ownership structure may influence the relation between 
leverage and average employee pay, our findings suggest that, as expected, the negative effect is 
prevalent for shareholder-oriented banks and that there is no effect for stakeholder-oriented banks. 
This may suggest, in accordance to Hanka (1998), that debt may increase shareholder wealth by 
reducing labour costs. Secondly, when we include the financial crisis, it is observed that the negative 
effect of leverage remains negative; additionally, the results suggest that the effect of leverage differs 
during the crisis, however this difference is not statistically significant.  
Finally, the non-linear feature of the relationship between leverage and average employee pay 
seems evident, as we observe that the effects on average wages differ as leverage changes. In this 
sense, we identify that the negative relation between leverage and employee pay is significant only for 
values of leverage between 53% and 83%. Following the same line of reasoning presented in Hanka 
(1998), if this relation is explained by a disciplinary mechanism, the negative relation between leverage 
and employee pay reveals a threshold effect. Therefore, it suggests that for certain levels of debt there 
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will be a constraint in wages to competitive levels, thus, further increases have no additional effect on 
wages. 
Our panel data study shows that a bank’s capital has a positive effect of on average wages and 
it establishes a link between finance and the labour market, thus bringing to the forefront questions 
that need to be taken into account for policy makers. Our results also highlight new questions for 
further research, such as the determination of leverage thresholds that may harm wages, and it has 
also contributed by suggesting a novel approach for researchers wishing to deal with endogeneity.  
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Appendix   
A.1. The Bankscope Dataset 
The Bankscope database, provided by the Bureau van Dijk (BvD), is a unique collection of micro-level 
banking information for different countries. This database contains financial information on banks 
worldwide. Content includes balance sheet data, income and expenses, ratios and other annual 
financial data years. Information on global and country-specific rankings (by total assets) is also 
available and ownership information as well. 
The descriptive information includes addresses, contact numbers and web addresses, directors 
and managers, banks’ specialisation, world and country rankings, auditor and auditor’s qualification 
of the statement, various identification numbers as well as the history of the bank. The financial data 
is collected for a rolling period thus when a new year of data is added, the oldest data is dropped, 
which means that only the most recent data for each company is available. In our analysis we use 
information for the period 1987 to 2015. 
Regarding its content, it offers a global coverage providing standardized variables for comparing 
banks across countries and regions. Thus, it comprises information on detailed financials which are 
presented in multiple formats, including the universal format to compare banks globally. This 
standardisation is the result of the development of the Fitch Universal Format with the adoption of the 
IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) by the majority of European banks as well as many 
Asian and Central American banks.  
 
  
A.2. Definition of variables 
Table A.2: Variables definition 
Variables  Definition 
Average employee pay Logarithm of average employee pay, computed as the natural logarithm of 
total labour expenses. Labour expenses include: wages, salaries, social 
security costs, pension costs and other staff costs, including expensing of 
staff stock options. 
Regulatory tier one capital This measure of capital adequacy measures Tier 1 capital. It comprises 
regulatory tier 1 capital divided by risk weighted assets. It seeks to measure 
whether the pool of permanent funds available to the bank is sufficient to 
neutralize the risks. This figure should be at least 4%. 
Interest coverage ratio (ICR) Ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to interest expense. It 
represents the capacity of the firm to pay interest on debt. In terms of 
profitability, a high ICR indicates that the firm will be capable of paying 
interest on debt even in difficult times. 
Liabilities to total assets It corresponds to liabilities divided to total assets. This ratio examines how 
much of a firm’s assets are made of liabilities. Banks with higher liabilities 
to total assets ratios should have higher financing and debt service costs, 
than banks with lower ratios. 
Profitability Return on average assets (ROAA), computed as net income divided by 
average total assets. This ratio compares the efficiency and operational 
performance of banks as it looks at the returns generated from the bank’s 
assets. 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets.  
Business diversification Non-interest income divided by gross revenue. This ratio indicates de amount 
of fees, trading and asset sale income to total revenues, which also includes 
net interest income. 
Employee productivity Net income divided by the number of employees. This ratio shows the 
participation of a company’s employees in its financial figures such as 
profits. 
Distressed Dummy variable taking value one if the bank is distressed and zero if the 
bank is safe. We define distressed banks as those with z-scores that fall in 
the lowest 10 percent of the distribution. 
Crisis Dummy variable taking value one if year=2008 and year=2009, and zero for 
the previous and subsequent years of the sample. 
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A.3. Bank specialization 
 
Table A.3: Bank specialization 
Bankscope Classification 
Commercial banks Mainly active in a combination of retail banking (Individuals, SMEs), Wholesale Banking 
(large corporates) and Private banking (not belonging to groups of savings banks, 
cooperative banks). 
Savings banks Mainly active in Retail Banking (Individuals, SMEs) and usually belonging to a group of 
savings banks. 
Cooperative banks Cooperative banks have a cooperative ownership structure and are mainly active in Retail 
Banking (Individuals, SMEs). 
Real Estate & Mortgage 
banks 
Mainly active in Mortgage Financing and Project Development. 
Investment banks 
 
Mainly active in Corporate Finance, Debt/Equity Issues, Mergers & Acquisitions, 
Securities Trading and usually in Private Banking. 
Other non-banking credit 
institutions 
Institutions providing guarantees, money transfer companies, companies providing 
banking and non-banking financial services to groups of financial institutions. 
Specialized governmental 
credit institutions 
Institutions providing National Development Finance, Sectoral Finance or Export/Import 
Finance. This specialisation category includes Public Institutions acting on privileged or 
protected segments or benefiting from Governmental guarantee or sponsoring. 
Bank holdings & Holding 
companies 
Holding companies of bank groups, which usually have very limited business activities. 
Central banks Supervising national banking systems. 
Multi-lateral governmental 
banks 
Active in multi-lateral development finance. 
Micro-financing 
institutions 
Providing micro finance to individuals and very small companies. 
Securities firms Mainly active in Securities Trading/Arbitrage activities/ Securities Brokerage/Derivatives. 
Private banking/Asset 
management companies 
Banks mainly active in private banking and asset management. 
Investment & Trust 
corporations 
 
Investment Corporations/Investment Trust Companies and Private Equity 
Companies/Property Developers and Covered Bond Issuers investing in various assets. 
Finance companies 
 
Consumer Finance Companies, Credit Card Companies, Factoring Companies, Leasing 
Companies, Trade Finance Companies 
Clearing & Custody 
institutions 
Institutions providing clearing and custody services. 
Group finance companies Companies mainly active in attracting funding for and lending on behalf of the group. 
Source: Bankscope (2015). 
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